Light Touches: A Media Aesthetic Mapping of Touch by Elo, Mika
It is often helpful to start an academic essay with some comments 
on the title. Unpacking the key terms that appear in the title is an 
economical way of preparing the ground for a discourse that nec-
essarily takes place within a limited frame. This kind of gesture is 
very much needed here as well.
My title consists of two parts that both, more or less, say the 
same – albeit in different modes. Whereas the first part “Light 
Touches” is rather elliptic, the second part “A Media Aesthetic 
Mapping of Touch” fulfills the standard form of an academic sub-
title by offering additional information concerning the focus and 
approach. Together they suggest that the topic of this essay will 
be “touch”, and that the topic will be touched upon “lightly” in 
terms of a “mapping” which has “media aesthetic” motivations. 
I would claim, however, that the double structure of my title says 
also something else. A certain tension, or a fundamental complica-
tion, that a discourse on touching needs to deal with is inscribed in 
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peculiar topic challenges – or should I say contaminates – the dis-
course to such a degree that the approach becomes part of the is-
sue. A discourse that in any pertinent sense is touching upon “touch” 
becomes also touched by its topic.1 The expression “pertinent sense” 
marks here the challenge of developing a discourse in an area where 
the criteria for making distinctions between the proper and meta-
phorical senses of touch are anything but clear. In a pertinent dis-
course on touch, the “what” and the “how” become entangled, even 
inseparable. All kinds of exploration, assorting, dissecting, demar-
cating, defining – and mapping – presuppose contact or, at the very 
least, anticipation of a limit, which always means taking risks; try-
ing, testing and contesting the limits of control as well. The “map-
ping” that I attempt here consists of “light touches” in this sense.
But there is still another twist: “Light” can also be understood 
as the subject – or perhaps more aptly: agent – of touch. Insofar 
as the phrase “A Media Aesthetic Mapping of Touch” specifies the 
chosen theoretical view on the topic – the point of view of the es-
say – it effectively performs a visual logic that in accordance with 
a long history of “hegemony of vision”2 in Western thinking tends 
to format the discourse on touch. In short, the title hints at the fact 
that my discourse on touch, insofar as it is a “mapping” that aims 
at outlining the topic entitled “touch”, is itself necessarily touched 
by light, invested with visual forces that tend to organize the dis-
course into a visually motivated knowledge production.
In order to gain new knowledge, a researcher has to make use 
of some kind of tactics when sorting out whatever is under scruti-
1 This is one of the key issues in Jacques Derrida, On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy, 
trans. Christine Irizarry, California, Stanford University Press, 2005 [2000].
2 See e.g. David Michael Levin (ed.), Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1993; Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes – The Denigration 
of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought, Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1993.
ny. Usually we speak of this in terms of a method or an approach 
and focus on assessing its viability. It is worth noting, hovewer, that 
the medium of research consists of culturally determined variables 
that change over time. A discourse on touching touched by light be-
comes a meeting place of at least two divergent logics (in shorthand 
I call them “visual” and “tactile”), and as such, it touches upon the 
cultural status of the differing modalities of sense and the roles of 
sense modalities in a knowledge-oriented discursive setting. 
It is here that the “media aesthetic” motivations of my essay 
come into picture. In my use of the term “media aesthetics” I at-
tach myself to the heterogeneous tradition that combines media 
theoretical questions with theories of perception and embodied ex-
perience. Its key questions revolve around the rise of new modes 
of representation, perceptual habits and bodily techniques ena-
bled or enhanced by new technical apparatuses, such as photogra-
phy and film, and more recently a whole array of electronic and 
digital media. Media aesthetics studies, from a variety of perspec-
tives, the framing conditions of our seemingly natural sense per-
ception against the backdrop of all these “media”. How to relate 
our sense experience to the technological processes that signifi-
cantly contribute to our sense of reality? How does touch figure in 
these processes?
Walter Benjamin’s remarks concerning the historicity of 
the “medium of perception”3 and Marshall McLuhan’s “sense ra-
tio hypothesis”4 still function as key points of reference in contem-
3 ”Just as the entire mode of existence of human collectives changes over long historical 
periods, so too does their mode of perception. The way in which human perception 
is organized – the medium in which it occurs – is conditioned not only by nature 
but by history.” Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings vol. 3, ed. Michael W. Jennings 
et al., various tranlators, Cambridge Massachusetts and London, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2002, 104. 
4 Cf. David Parisi in this volume.
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porary media aesthetic discussions, especially with regard to the 
contexts of media theoretical research and sensory anthropology. 
As W.J.T. Mitchell notes, media aesthetic discussions often show a 
rather conservative tendency to return to questions of remediation 
of older media forms in the midst of rapidly changing new media 
landscape.5 Here, the basic conceptual settings – such as Roland 
Barthes’ image / music / text or Friedrich Kittler’s gramophone / 
film / typewriter – build, in one way or another, on demarcation of 
sense modalities, echoing the classical division of the “media” of 
drama in Aristotle (melos, opsis, lexis).6 
In recent media aesthetic discussions, increasing attention has 
been paid to the questions of environmental mediations instead of 
the senses and their mediation. Transcendental subjectivity that 
for a long time figured as the key philosophical point of reference 
and, in phenomenologies of corporeality, as one of the main tar-
gets of criticism, has lost its key role as the discussions have shift-
ed their focus to questions of relationality, non-human actors and 
environmentality. A proponent of this shift, Eric Hörl announces 
an “emergence of a general ecology” and highlights multiple cyber-
netic processes that lead to bypassing the subject of perception 
and urge us to focuse on relational and technical aspects of being 
in the world.7 Questions of touch, however, introduce in this setting 
a new angle and open up alternative paths for reconceptualizing 
mediality with regard to environmental and relational issues with-
5 W.J.T. Mitchell, ”Media Aesthetics”, Thinking Media Aesthetics. Media Studies, 
Film Studies and the Arts, ed. Liv Hausken, Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2013, 
23.
6 Ibid.
7 Eric Hörl, ”A Thousand Ecologies: The Process of Cyberneticization and 
General Ecology,” trans. James Burton et al., The Whole Earth. California and 
the Disappearance of the Outside, eds. Diedrich Diedrichsen and Anselm Francke, 
Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2013, 121–130.
out cutting the discourse off from questions of sense experience. A 
closer look at the senses of touch is needed – and an appropriate 
touch to the topic.
SENSES OF TOUCH
First, a gesture of general mapping: In Western culture, touch as 
a sense modality has been both over- and undervalued. Beside vi-
sion – considered the noblest of senses – touch has been regarded 
as vague, vulgar, drive-related, and thus even impure. Partly due 
to these very same – potentially subversive – qualities touch has 
been invested with various emancipatory expectations. At the same 
time, it has been seen both as the basis of sense certainty and rath-
er normative support to the theoretical gaze. This ambivalence im-
plies that the sense of touch – or more precisely: the sense of it – is 
over-determined.8 It is no wonder, then, that over the past few dec-
ades lively debates concerning the cultural implications of touch as 
a sense modality have emerged in many areas of research.9 
Touch interconnects existential, aesthetic, cognitive and practi-
cal aspects of reality in an inconspicuous but intensive way, travers-
ing both bodily and discoursive practices.10 Accordingly, the range 
of contexts where touching figures, in one way or another, is over-
8 Bernhard Waldenfels, Bruchlinien der Erfahrung. Phänomenologie, Psychoanalyse, 
Phänomenotechnik, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2002, 64.
9 See for example Laura Marks Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2002; Constance Classen (ed.), The 
Book of Touch, New York and Oxford, Berg Publishers, 2005; Mark Paterson, The 
Senses of Touch. Haptics, Affects and Technologies, New York and Oxford, Berg 
Publishers, 2007, David P. Parisi, Archaeologies of Touch: Interfacing with Haptics 
from Electricity to Computing, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, [forth-
coming 2018].
10 Cf. Waldenfels, Bruchlinien der Erfahrung, passim; Jean-Louis Chrétien, The Call 
and the Response, trans. Anne A. Davenport, New York, Fordham University Press, 
2004 [1992]; Classen, Book of Touch, 2005.
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whelming: perception, interface design, consumer culture, sexual-
ity, the arts, social relations, war, religion, spirituality, and so on. I 
will adress only a few. 
Touch and its cultural meanings have often been associated with 
the skin. An interface between the own and the foreign, skin consti-
tutes a sensitive realm open to various interpretations.11 One of the 
nineteenth-century pioneers of physiology, Ernst Heinrich Weber, 
determined and mapped the sensitivity of human tactile system 
and thus laid the foundation for neuro-physiological harnessing 
of touch.12 Ashley Montagu’s pioneering experiments on chimpan-
zees in the 1970s demonstrated that the tactile sense plays a crucial 
role in the early psychophysiological development of mammals.13 In 
the 1980s, Didier Anzieu added a new layer to these discussions by 
analysing various patterns of skin-related mental imagery that are 
momentous for the formation of the ego. He argued that the skin 
is a coordinative and cohesive factor behind the whole system of 
the senses, one that organizes the human experiential horizon in 
its entirety, including the structures of space, time and language.14 
During the past few decades, the cultural strata of the skin, such as 
clothing, make-up, and tattoos, have aroused great interest.15 The 
digital media technologies of our times, on their part, invite us to 
consider something like “techno skin”, or the technological consti-
11 See e.g. Claudia Benthien, Skin. The Cultural Border of Self and the World, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 2002; Steven Connor, The Book of Skin, London, 
Reaktion Books, 2004; Dave Boothroyd, “Touch, Time and Technics: Levinas and 
the Ethics of Haptic Communications.” Theory, Culture and Society 26 (2–3), 2009, 
330–345.
12 Cf. Parisi in this volume.
13 See e.g. Classen, The Book of Touch, 46–47.
14 Didier Anzieu, The Skin Ego, trans. Naomi Segal, London, Karnac, 2016 [1995].
15 Cf. Benthien, Skin; Classen, The Book of Touch.
tution of the contacting surfaces that define our bodily being.16 Skin 
is not only a physiological site, it is also an existential structure. 
The sense of touch as a topic clearly hints at the fact that “sense” 
is one of those fateful words, where language as the historically lay-
ered resource of thinking comes to the fore. Sense involves significa-
tion and sensing, but it is not reducible to the domain of meanings 
or clear-cut sense modalities, not even to causal relations.17 Sense 
has a peculiar role in verbal discourse: it doesn’t exist outside the 
proposition that expresses it, but, at the same time, it doesn’t merge 
with its expression since discourse needs to touch upon something 
beyond itself in order to make sense.18 Sense – in all senses of the 
word “sense” – plays a multifaceted role in a discourse without be-
ing fully captured in its operations. Outlining the sense of touch as 
a topic presupposes something like sense for touch in the arrange-
ment of the outlining gestures. On the level of discourse, touch is 
distributed, in an ambiguous way, across the divide of the suppos-
edly proper and metaphorical senses of “touch”. 
16 Since recently biotechnologies enable the development of artificial skin by means 
of which prostheses and robots can “feel” touch, https://www.seeker.com/artifi-
cial-skin-offers-robots-amputees-sense-of-touch-discovery-news-1767180961.html 
[accessed 4 June 2017]. 
17 See for example Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Constantin V. Boundas, 
Mark Lester and Charles J. Stivale, London, Bloomsbury, 2015 [1969]; Jacques 
Derrida, Limited Inc., Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1988 [1972]; 
Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense of the World, Minneapolis, Minnesota University Press, 
1997 [1993]; Sens en tout sens. Autour des travaux de Jean-Luc Nancy, ed. Francis 
Guibal and Jean-Clet Martin, Paris, Éditions Galilée, 2004.
18 Deleuze notes, with reference to Stoic philosophy, that sense “is an incorporeal 
complex, and irreducible entity, at the surface of things, a pure event which in-
heres or subsists in the proposition”. Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 19.
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The difficulties encountered when trying to define the sense 
of touch were highlighted already in Aristotle’s De Anima.19 He 
noted that the objects of touch are many, and that touch has no 
clearly definable organ. Touch is in many ways more complex and 
comprehensive than the other sensory forms. It is indispensable 
to all animals and belongs inseparably to the living body without, 
however, being the faculty of any particular body part – not even 
the skin. In short, it is difficult to define touch as a sense modality, 
since it is not, in any simple way, an organ-related mode of sensing. 
What can be felt as touch are not only certain sensuous qualities; 
we are in touch with anything and everything that can be felt and 
sensed by the body. Following Bernhard Waldenfels, we can say 
that touch is a prototype of sense experience per se.20 Light touch-
es the eye, heartbeat touches the palpating finger, sound waves 
touch the eardrum... 
Even if these examples hint at the ways in which physical con-
tact is part of all forms of perception, it would be too simplistic 
to reduce touching to some kind of prototypical tactility of sense 
experience. From an experiential perspective touch involves also 
mental and social, sometimes even spiritual processes. Instead of 
speaking of the sense of touch, it seems more appropriate to speak 
in plural of senses of touch.21  In another vocabulary one could al-
so speak of feeling and being affected.22 Still another angle is in-
troduced through the vocabulary of faculties, abilities and skills, 
19 Aristotle, De Anima, trans. J. A. Smith, in The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross, 
vol. III, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1931. See also Mika Elo, “Digital finger. 
Beyond phenomenological figures of touch”, Journal of Aesthetics and Culture vol. 
4, 2012, DOI: 10.3402/jac.v4i0.14982.
20 Waldenfels, Bruchlinien der Erfahrung, 71.
21 Cf. Paterson, The Senses of Touch, 1–5.
22 Cf. Mika Elo, “Formatting the Senses of Touch”, Transformations 22, 2012. http://
www.transformationsjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Elo_Trans22.pdf
especially in the arts where the skills and capabilities are pushed 
to their limits.23 
In a strict sense, touching always takes place at a limit. The 
figure of limit could even be considered the common denominator 
of the ensemble of senses of touch that is at stake in this essay. It 
is important to note, however, that the limit in this sense is not a 
physical border. “The limit” names the ultimate point of vulnerabil-
ity that forces and allows a touching gesture to get into touch with 
itself, to find its measure and proper mode, its tact. It is more of a 
demand than a categorical delimitation. This demand is enjoyably 
and painfully present in all modes of aiming at pertinence, here in 
the space of lined-up words as well as in any kind of intercourse 
with pressing matters. This demanding structure is not entirely re-
flexive, since touching is always also transitive, as Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
paradoxical formulation “to self-touch you” (se toucher toi) presses.24 
Touching involves a gap; it goes across a distance without any 
guarantee of a securing return. Tact is thus not a matter of volition-
al attentiveness or artfulness. It is heterotrophic sensitivity, that is, 
a response to the untouchable encountered in touching. Another 
name for this sensibility towards something that lies beyond ones 
own cababilities is passibility.25 This pathic moment of touching 
shows that tact is over-determined and is thus not reducible to a 
skill. Already before it can turn into a social matter between two 
or more parties, it is answering to a singular otherness. In other 
words, tact is not to be understood as psychophysical discretion, 
23 Cf. Mika Elo, “Notes on media sensitivity in artistic research”, Exposition of 
Artistic Research: Publishing Art in Academia, eds. Michael Schwab and Henk 
Borgdorff, Leiden, Leiden University Press, 2014, 25–38.
24 Derrida, On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy, 34, passim.
25 See for example the thematic issue “Pathos / Passibilität”, Internationales 
Jahrbuch für Medienphilosophie Band 3, eds. Jörg Sternagel and Michael Mayer, 
Berlin, de Gruyter, 2017.
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but as a name for taking it upon oneself to “touch without touching, 
without touching too much, where touching is already too much”, 
as Derrida puts it.26 
The “law of tact”27 that applies to touch in its all dimensions is 
revealing of the fact that touch is always in danger of turning in-
to either an appropriating grip, which aims at overcoming the un-
bridgeable difference between the touching and the touched, or 
into simple avoidance of contact, which means leaving the differ-
ences encountered as they are. The twist of this law lies in the fact 
that tactful contact never is quite in phase with itself: a distance 
is inherent in even the most intimate of contacts. Tact is exposure 
to this difference.
AMBIGUOUS DEMARCATIONS
In order to gain further insight into the various senses of touch – 
and into the ambiguity of demarcations between proper and meta- 
phorical senses of “touch” – we must search in familiar analyses of 
sensibility for breaking points of the conventional schematization 
of touch as a species of the genus sensation.28 Cathryn Vasseleu 
has highlighted one this kind of breaking point in Immanuel Kant’s 
Anthropology. The ambivalent position that Berührung (referring 
both to tactility and affectivity) takes there with regard to the dis-
tinction between the so-called objective and subjective senses is 
symptomatic of the difficulties of subsuming touch under the cate-
gory of sense modality, a clear-cut domain of sensory experience.29 
26 Derrida, On Touching, 67.
27 Ibid., passim.
28 Edith Wyschogrod, “Doing Before Hearing: On the Primacy of Touch”, Textes 
pour Emmanuel Lévinas, ed. François Laruelle, Paris, Éditions Jean-Michel Place, 
1980, 193.
29 Cathryn Vasseleu, “Touch, Digital Communication and the Ticklish”, Angelaki 4.2, 
1999, 155.
For Kant, touch is, on the one hand, a sense of differentiation vital 
to our physical relation with external objects. On the other hand, 
as feeling, it is a sense by means of which we partake of things 
affectively.30 
Another breaking point can be found in the extensive philosophi-
cal debate concerning the relations between touch and vision, which 
is known as “Molyneux’s problem”. The problem, formulated by 
the Irish philosopher William Molyneux, is the following: if a man 
born blind regains his sight, is he able to recognize, by means of visual 
perception only, objects he has learned to know through mere touch?31 
Behind this problem concerning the connection between visual 
and tactile perception lies the mind-body dualism characteristic of 
René Descartes’ thought, and the ambivalent interplay of the mind 
and the body in their “lived union” articulated in it.32 The problem 
concerns the tensional relation between what we might call “mind’s 
eye” and “comprehensive grasp” and its conceptual implications. On 
the basis of what do we think of the so-called contact between the 
sensing and the sensed and between the different modes of sens-
ing? Descartes’ contemporary, Nicolas Malebranche and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, who further developed Malebranche’s ideas in the 
phenomenological context, have both seen in the tension at the core 
of the Cartesian dualism an incentive to analysing the relation of 
the mind and the body precisely as a question of touch.33
Third breaking point that I would like to touch upon here can 
be found in Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytical thinking. In Freud’s 
view, namely, it is touch, or, “palpating impetus”, that structurally 
30 Ibid.
31 Janet Levin, ”Molyneux’s Problem and the Individuation of Perceptual Concepts,” 
Philosophical Studies 139, 2008, 1–28. DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9072-5.
32 Juho Hotanen, ”Merleau-Ponty ja Malebranchen subjekti”, Kosketuksen figuureja, 
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links together bodily being, perception and thinking, and thus forms 
an essential feature of what he called “extensionality” (Ausdehnung) 
of the psyche.34 
The multifaceted theme of psychic extensionality can be illu-
minated with help of a note of Freud’s published posthumously: 
 “Psyche is extended; knows nothing about it”.35 Even though the 
processes of knowledge formation and cognition always involve 
fumbling and feeling about, psychic touch is not reducible to a mat-
ter of knowledge and consciousness, tastender Vorstoß is not re-
ducible to a rudiment of theory formation supported by visuali-
ty. Freud’s remark hints at the fact that psychic events take their 
place in a space the extensionality (Ausdehnung) of which escapes 
physical dimensionality and the cognitive framework grounded on 
it. What makes things even more complex is that the extensionali-
ty of the psyche is not the inner psychological horizon of conscious 
affects, either. Rather, the psyche is articulated as a feeling of the 
tension between these dimensions, and the sorting out of their re-
lations takes place through a complex machinery of defence mech-
nisms and processes of rationalization.36 
FIGURES OF TOUCH
Further breaking points can be traced in the metaphoric patterns 
of languages. An alert reader has already paid attention to the 
ways in which visual metaphors tend to slide into my argumenta-
34 Sigmund Freud, “Negation”, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XIX, ed. James Strachey, trans. James Strachey et 
al., 238. (As the English rendering of tastender Vorstoß by “tentative advance” 
here misses the tactile connotations of the original, I have used the moreliteral 
 “palpating impetus”)
35 Freud, “Findings, Ideas, Problems”, in The Standard Edition, vol. XXIII, 300; Cf. 
Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A. Rand, New York, Fordham University 
Press, 2008 [2006], 21.
36 Cf. Elo, “Formatting the Senses of Touch”.
tion as if they were unavoidable steps in it. As Hans Blumenberg 
notes, light-related metaphors function as “absolute metaphors” 
in Western knowledge-oriented discourse.37 This means that their 
figurality has become naturalized to such degree that it goes unno-
ticed; they have become, well, “transparent”. 
If I would allow the visual logic to take the lead, I would intro-
duce here a clear-cut demarcation between visual metaphorics and 
figures of touch. This would probably lead me to reaffirming the 
kind of figures that Derrida calls ”haptocentric”, that is, conceptu-
al tropes that present the sense of touch as the ultimate guarantee 
of tangible reality and its visual mastery.38 Typical substrate for 
this kind of figures is the human hand. Derrida highlights this in 
many ways in On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy. He even structures 
his discussion in a critical relation to the figure of the hand in five 
Tangents: “five, like the five fingers of one hand, like the five sens-
es”.39 Based on this haptocentric setting I could focus on some tan-
gible examples of tactile figuration. But if I stick to the setting un-
folded in the previous pages where touch is presented as something 
that subsists also beyond the tangible world, I need to take anoth-
er path and consider whether and how touch might figure in a dis-
course also beyond figures – insofar as “figure” refers to something 
that has a clear shape, to something that can be mastered visually 
 – like the hand or a pointing finger. 
In order to track the effects of touch in the discourse beyond 
figures we need to redirect our attention to questions of rhythm, 
punctuation and intensity. Here, the figures of touch are not only 
shapeless, they are also weightless. Or, more precisely, they are 
37 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp, 1999, 10–12.
38 Derrida, On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy, passim.
39 Derrida, On Touching, 182.
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weightless in themselves like the fulcrum between the scales. They 
gain weight and become concrete only in a particular relation. This 
complicates the question as to where to draw the dividing line be-
tween the metaphorical and proper senses of touch – and whether 
this line can be drawn at all. 
In order to counterbalance the tendency in international dis-
cussions to tracing concepts back to their Greek and Latin roots, 
I will make a detour to the Finnish language and to the semantic 
network of a couple of words that play a local but crucial role in the 
conceptual arrangement of senses of touch. I am not making this 
detour in order to establish more solid conceptual proof. Instead, I 
want to highlight the fact that language is a rich and multi-layered 
archive of displaced similarities and connections that contribute 
to the sense-order we tend to take for granted.40 
The first word I would like to single out as a point of contact 
with the ways in which senses of touch operate in the Finnish lan-
guage is the verb tuntea. It aptly collates the meanings of ‘‘feeling’’ 
and ‘‘knowing’’. It suggests that when you know, you also feel, and 
when you feel, knowing is already implied. The weight of this word 
in any particular idiom demonstrates how obscure the boundaries 
between the bodily and mental aspects of touch are from the view-
point of embodied experience. The Finnish expression tuntea na-
hoissaan (literally: “to feel in one’s skins”), for example, expresses 
a concrete state of knowing by bodily experience. Touch, feeling, 
and recognition are entangled, and their ensemble implicates a sen-
tience that can be articulated both as cognitive apprehension and 
affective tone. Especially evocative is also the Finnish version of the 
classical imperative “know thyself” (gnothi seauton), tunne itsesi.
40 I am referring here to the mimetic dimension of language that plays an impor-
tant role in Benjamin’s philosophy of language. See for example “On the Mimetic 
Faculty”, Selected Writings vol. 2/2, 722.
The second word that contributes to the conceptual arrangement 
of the senses of touch is the Finnish verb tarttua (‘‘to grasp’’, ‘‘to 
catch’’, ‘‘to apprehend’’, ‘‘to seize’’). It points towards the multiple 
intertwined aspects of touch in a slightly different way. The word 
refers both to grabbing or holding firmly and to being exposed to 
the possibility of contamination. A hand, dirt, disease, laughter and 
various fancies may be caught and catching in different ways. The 
semantic network of this word suggests that every contact, wheth-
er mental or bodily, is potentially contagious. 
The question whether these entanglements are just metaphoric, 
or do they have something more concrete, or “proper”, about them, 
brings me to the third word I want to ponder here: the Finnish 
word for “concrete”, “palpable” or “tangible”, kouriintuntuva, which 
literally means “what makes itself felt/known to the hands”. It 
hints at the fact that not only the physical contact of the appro-
priating hand but also the heterotrophic feel are involved in what 
we normally conceive as “concrete contact”. Physical contact is 
suggestive in its seeming immediacy, and it obviously serves link-
ing comprehensive grasp and minds eye, as for example when we 
confirm the correctness of a visual impression by palpating the 
object seen. What is less obvious is the fact that the experiential 
fullness established through such coordination of the hand and the 
eye always ultimately relies on alterity. The physical and mental 
contact never fully coincide. In experiential terms, every concrete 
contact has two sides: the self that feels and something felt. The 
latter, as precisely this something that is felt, always escapes the 
control of the self. It is close by, but at the same time it remains 
at a distance, it remains something other, something that cannot 
be fully appropriated. With touch, thinking faces the paradoxical 
challenge of concreteness: What is most tangible is the foreignness 
at the heart of the familiar.
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The verbal entanglements that I highlighted through the se-
lection of these three Finnish words hint at the ways in which the 
theme of touch interlinks the physical, biological, psychophysical, 
social, mental and affective dimensions of contact. Their operative 
logic – linking, connecting, intertwining – reflects the intimate con-
nection between affective and tactile aspects of touch and the vul-
nerability of embodied existence. Here we encounter the fact that 
besides the historical lines of conceptual filiation and discursive 
tropism, sheer moments of juxtaposition, idiomatic dispositions, 
and horizontal relations contribute to sense – in every sense of the 
word “sense”. We all know how this logic of contiguity is enacted in 
jokes and in word games that reveal how words constitute a “cav-
ernous network” with hidden interconnections.41 
Whereas sight upholds metaphors of light that outline the phe-
nomenal world cognitively, thus creating the basis for a uniform 
discourse on truth, touch tends to complicate metaphoric patterns 
and even decompose them. While metaphors of light produce conti-
nuity and uniformity, that is, homeostasis, the effects of touch repre-
sent furthermore a diastasis (dia–‘‘separate’’, stasis–‘‘localisation’’) 
of language.42 Here, we are literally dealing with a spatiotemporal 
dislocation of the processes of signification in the structures, ac-
41 Walter Benjamin, “Denkbilder”, Gesammelte Schfriften IV/1, ed. Rolf Tiedemann 
and Hermann Schweppenhäuser in cooperation with Theodor W. Adorno and 
Gershom Scholem, Frankfurt am Main Suhrkamp, 1991, 432. With regard to 
the mimetic dimension of language that is at stake here, one of the key texts is 
Werner Hamacher’s ”The Word Wolke – If It Is One”, Benjamin’s Ground – New 
Readings of Walter Benjamin, ed. Rainer Nägele, Detroit: Wayne State University 
Press, 1988.
42 Waldenfels, Bruchlinien der Erfahrung, 78.
cents and rhythms of language.43 On a linguistic level, at stake is the 
unstable relation between the supposedly proper and metaphoric 
senses of touch. In existential or experiential terms, this reflects 
the intimate connection between affective and tactile aspects of 
touch and the vulnerability of embodied existence.
Against this background, touch appears as a sense of being in 
the world, of being exposed. This is to say that touch exceeds the 
tactile world – and not only metaphorically. “Touch” as the topic 
I am touching upon, is more than the sense of touch, more than a 
sense modality; more than “a species of the genus sensation”.44 This 
implies that theoretical attempts at upholding a clear-cut distinc-
tion between an “immediate” and a “deep” touch is insufficient.45 It 
is true that touch is not only a matter of contacting surfaces, it also 
has, at the same time, affective depth, touch is inevitably ambiva-
lent, since exactly the same kind of physical contact can strike one 
in different ways depending on the situation. As Edith Wyschogrod 
remarks, the ordinary language reveals that “to be touched” is to be 
moved in the whole of one’s being.46 Coming into touch, or being in 
touch – actually, I am tempted to say even “being touch” – involves 
an exposure. With the word “exposure” we encounter again the dou-
ble bind between vision and touch: whatever is exposed in terms 
of touch, is exposed to light as well, insofar as it is recognized in its 
appearance, that is, insofar as it becomes phenomenal.
43 Here we encounter processes that Julia Kristeva famously has termed signifi-
ance. See e.g. Julia Kirsteva, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature 
and Art, ed. Leon S. Roudiez, trans. Thomas Gora and Alice Jardine, Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1980 [1969].
44 Wyschogrod, “Doing Before Hearing”, 193.
45 Cf. Paterson, The Senses of Touch, 1–14. I see the definite article in the title of 
Paterson’s book as a symptom of a theoretical inclination for clear-cut definitions 
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THE PATHIC MOMENT OF TOUCH
If I was asked to highlight one point of major importance in the se-
ries of “light touches” that I am presenting here on the peculiar topic 
of “touch”, I would point with my finger at – if you allow me to use this 
figure of a gesture that is absolutely impotent in this case – I would 
point with my finger at the pathic dimension of touch. This theme 
figuring in many ways in the phenomenological tradition – most 
prominently in the thinking of Erwin Strauss, Henri Maldiney, Jean-
Luc Nancy and Bernhard Waldenfels – takes us to the obscure bor-
derlands of the phenomenal world and beyond the domain of vis-
ually structured representations.47 
The term “pathic” is derived from the Greek pathos, which re-
fers to sensitivity, sentience, affectability, and suffering. As is well 
known, this kind of sensibility functions as a protective mechanism 
and in this way serves the life processes. It is also well known that 
pathos is a necessary aspect to every theoretical engagement with 
a subject matter not yet known. Transformation in and through 
contact is one of the basic concerns of hermeneutics, for example.48 
But there is still another concrete, though usually ignored, signifi-
cation to pathos: exposure to something excessive and unexpect-
ed that may leave painful marks, wounds even. Accordingly, the 
pathic aspect of touch is a matter not only of active sentience, but 
also, and more generally, of susceptibility to ruptures in the horizon 
of abilities. As Bernhard Waldenfels has shown in Bruchlinien der 
 
 
47 Cf. Sami Santanen in this volume.
48 Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode – Grundzüge einer philosophischen 
Hermeneutik. Gesammlete Werke, Band 1, Tübingen, J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 
1990 [1960]. 
Erfahrung in great detail, such ruptures characterize the structure 
of experience at large.49 
The fractured horizon of pathic experience pre-exists all psycho-
logical and social settings of tactile and affective behaviour. In this 
terrain touch appears as a “sense for foreigness” (Fremdheitssinn 
as Waldenfels puts it – Derrida’s related term is “tact”)50. Touch 
is “sense for foreigness” in two senses: Firstly, insofar as touching is 
an ability, it is an ability to touch something foreign, something other. 
It is impossible to touch the same. We do not feel the same, we feel 
only differences – or, in the extreme case, the lack of them. Secondly, 
insofar as the pathic moment of touching marks the rupture of all 
forms of being able, it implies that touching relies on a foreign ele-
ment, which necessarily remains beyond reach, untouchable, not as 
 “the untouchable” in general but as something that a singular touch 
encounters at – or as – its own limit. The pathic moment cannot 
be pointed at, it needs to be felt. In discourse, this implies engage-
ment in presentation.
The figure of rupture, the “fracture-lines” (Bruchlinien), in 
Waldenfelds’ delicate attempt of describing the pathic reality of 
experience hints at the extreme difficulties of overcoming the 
deep-rooted conceptual setting where continuities, coherences 
and abilities are privileged, whereas interruptions, gaps and ina-
bilities are denigrated. In this setting, the pathic tends to be the un-
derdog. As Dieter Kliche suggests, we can historically speak even 
of pathologization of pathos.51 He shows how the origins of modern 
49 Waldenfels, Bruchlinien der Erfahrung, 71. 
50 Ibid., 64.
51 Dieter Kliche “Ästhetische Pathologie: Ein Kapitel aus der Begriffsgeschichte der 
Ästhetik”, Archiv der Begriffsgeschichte Band 42, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 
2001, 197–229. See also Kathrin Busch, “Ästhetiken radikalisieter Passivität”, 
Internationales Jahrbuch für Medienphilosophie Band 3, eds. Jörg Sternagel and 
Michael Mayer, Berlin, de Gruyter, 2017, 52–54.
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aesthetics is marked by a shift from Baroque rhetorics that com-
bines the knowledge of the passions with ethics and medicine to 
a separation of aesthetics from anthropology that involves a de-
valuation of the concept “pathological”. In Kliche’s diagnosis, the 
philosophical skepticism towards affectivity gaining a systematical 
shape in the critical philosophy of Kant marked the point where 
pathos was subordinated to active mental capacities. This shift in 
conceptual framing – not Kant’s philosophy as such – contributed 
to the fact that pathos came to be seen as something pathological, 
morbid, a lesser capacity of the senses that belongs to the concerns 
of anthropology rather than those of aesthetics.52 This shift led to 
a diffusion of the concept of aesthetics; and it seems to be haunt-
ing the discourse on touching as well. In philosophical debates, the 
hierachization of abilities implied in the pathologization of pathos 
has been contested in many ways. Various gestures of rehabilitat-
ing pathos can be discerned in the writings of Nietzsche, Artaud, 
Blanchot, Deleuze and Agamben, and others.53 All these gestures, 
in their peculiar ways, address the ways in which the pathic is con-
stitutive of experience at large. In knowledge-oriented discoursive 
settings, however, the pathic moment tends to become subordinat-
ed to knowledge production.
TOUCH AND MEDIA
What can be gained from this schematic account of the multiple 
senses of touch with regard to contemporary media technologies 
that in one way or another involve touching? 
I would like to end this essay by outlining some media aesthetic 
implications of my take on the topic “touch” culminating in high-
lighting the pathic dimension of touching. 
52 Kliche “Ästhetische Pathologie”, 201.
53 Busch, “Ästhetiken radikalisieter Passivität”, 51–62.
Firstly, we need to take into account the fact that the enabling 
limits of human experience are constantly being displaced – both 
on individual and phylogenetic levels – through the very movement 
of experience. This movement requires and presupposes sensitivity 
to the boundaries between the proper and the improper, between 
the familiar and the foreign. On this elemental level, new media 
technologies do not introduce any radical break into the structure 
of experience, but they can function as catalysts of transformation.
Secondly, in these sensitive areas – at the enabling limits of 
human experience – we are invited to think in terms of immunity, 
contamination and responsibility, which should make us aware of 
the high relevance of the overdetermined theme of touch in this 
context. Insofar as media technologies touch upon these bound-
aries and contribute to shifting them by introducing new practic-
es, new conceptualizations, and new sensibilities, they have effects 
on our existential integrity. New media do not only introduce new 
social mediations in our lives, they also reshape our subjectivity. 
This means that the goings-on of the media technological opera-
tions that touch upon the enabling limits of experience become an 
ethical question in terms of “production of ethical subjectivity”.54 
Touch as the “sense for foreigness” prototypical of pathic experi-
ence plays here a crucial role.
We live in a world where the imperative of making present con-
stitutes one of the key issues of contemporary media technologies. 
One could even speak of a media technological megatrend, that is, 
the aspiration to eliminate the effect of spatial-temporal distances, 
to bring things right to our fingertips “in real time”. In this sense, 
the mainstream of media technology of our times consists of tech-
niques of making present. Within this megatrend, touch is under-
54 Boothroyd, “Touch, Time and Technics”, 333.
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stood from a point of view that Derrida calls “haptocentric”: the 
sense of touch is seen as the guarantee of tangible reality and the 
ultimate support for optical intuitionism.55 The haptocentric ideal is 
a seamless co-operation between vision and touch, and a clear-cut 
distinction between the different senses of touch.56 This is attempted 
at through representational harnessing of the sense of touch. With 
Cathryn Vasseleu we could also speak of formalization of touch that 
involves a reduction of the ambiguity of touching through technical 
and conceptual processes that aim at separating the affective and 
tactile dimensions of touch from each other in order to make them 
manageable and programmable within digital systems.57
Modern neurophysiological research has, in this vein, chopped 
the sense of touch into neurophysiological subsystems deter-
mined by different receptors (temperature, movement, pain, bal-
ance, etc.).58 However, the difficulties of defining touch are also ap-
pearing in neurophysiology: efforts to locate the subsystems as 
clearly defined representations in the cortex that would be com-
parable with the centres of sight and hearing, have so far failed.59 
 
 
55 Cf. Derrida, On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy, passim. 
56 On the critique of “haptocentrism” put forward by Derrida, see Elo “Digital 
Finger”, 2012.
57 According to Vasseleu, this leads to priorization of tactility over affectivity. 
Cathryn Vasseleu, “Touch, Digital Communication and the Ticklish”, passim. In 
other words: tactility is programmed to serve affectivity, which in turn is format-
ted by tactile mediations. Cf. Elo “Formatting”
58 See e.g. Matthew Ratcliffe, ‘Touch and Situatedness’, International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 16, no.3, 2007, 299–322; Peter W. Ross, ‘Common sense 
about qualities and senses’, Philosophical Studies 138, 2008, 299–316; Thomas A. 
Stoffregen and Benoit G. Bardy, ‘On specification of the senses’, Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences 24, 2001, 195–261.
59 Waldenfels makes this observation in 2002. Waldenfels, Bruchlinien der Erfahrung, 
69.
From a neuroscientific point of view, the senses of touch seem to be 
embedded in a distributed network of brain regions.60
Today, “haptocentric” rhetoric is used to prop up the idea 
of fullness of presence. Media operations are designed and pro-
grammed so as to enhance this fullness. Analysing the pathic mo-
ment of touch offers us an occasion to as well as matter for a crit-
ical investigation of the various formatting processes active in the 
background of the megatrend of making present. It helps us trace 
the ways in which conceptual, sensuous, discursive, affective and 
technological formats are intertwined in interface technologies.61 
Against this background, contemporary touchscreen technologies, 
for example, appear as sites where not only the multiple aspects 
and ambivalent tendencies of touch but also the enabling limits of 
experience at large are negotiated – on the level of our fingertips.
As soon as touch is articulated as a technological application 
field, as soon as it is harnessed62 and formalized63, the approach 
to it is by definition haptocentric, since the very idea of applying 
knowledge of touch is based on and motivated by representations 
of touch (as a sense modality). Interface design is typically motivat-
ed by operative structures that can best be described in terms of a 
feedback that affirms sensory and mental recognition and forms in 
60 Cf. Sjoerd J. H. Ebisch et al., ”Differential Involvement of Somatosensory and 
Interoceptive Cortices during the Observation of Affective Touch”, Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, Volume 23, Issue 7, 2011, 1808–1822.
61 Elo, “Formatting the Senses of Touch”, 2012.
62 Cf. David P. Parisi, “Tactile Modernity: On the Rationalization of Touch in the 
Nineteenth Century”, Literature and Media in the Nineteenth Century: Image, 
Sound, and Touch, eds. Colette Colligan and Margaret Linley, Farnham, Ashgate, 
2011, 189–213.
63 Cf. Vasseleu, “Touch, Digital Communication and the Ticklish”, passim.
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its functionality a circle that feeds the sense of selfpower.64 Within 
this haptocentric mainstream, the pathic moment of touch and the 
ethical dimensions of feedback remain in a dead angle. As noted 
already above, the ethical implications of ‘‘sensory enhancement’’ 
are not restricted to the level of practices and attitudes (in other 
words, the mediations of an ethical relationship), at stake are also 
the mechanisms of the constitution of an ethical subject.65
To sum up, the harnessing of touch can be seen as an effect of 
the intricate interplay between technological, sensuous, discursive 
and affective aspects of formatting. Insofar as the implicit or explic-
it aim is to functionalize touch and to integrate it into a system of 
digital mediations, these processes of formatting tend to represent 
touch as a sense that works in synchrony with vision and offers a 
support for optical intuitionism. They enhance the role of touch as 
the guarantee of sensory certainty. 
The logic of main stream interface design in digital culture is 
that of multiple targeting: it singles out functional gestures; builds 
up selected patterns of social behaviour; prioritises certain ways of 
making contact and staying in contact. Functionality of active touch 
and tactility is privileged. Haptocentric processes of formatting 
contribute to upholding the image of tangibility as the epitome of 
touching as well as the conception of the sense of touch as the guar-
antee of sensory certainty. All kinds of dysfunctionalities tend to be 
excluded as something pathological, as not belonging to a “healthy” 
communication, which in light of the casual imperative “let’s keep 
in touch” appears as a strange deferral of any kind of pathic event.
64 Robert Pfaller has highlighted the constitutive role of this kind of circuit in 
contemporary Western culture at large in Die Illusionen der anderen, Über das 
Lustprinzip in der Kultur, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2002. 
65 Boothroyd, “Touch, Time and Technics”, 333–335.
COLON
I began this essay by reflecting on its title. Even if I discussed var-
ious aspects of it in great detail, one element remained untouched: 
the colon separating and connecting the two parts of the title. Now, 
when focused on, this punctuation mark suddenly gains significant 
weight. It gives the impression of being the point around which 
most of the articulations of the whole essay are organized. It ap-
pears as the fulcrum of the essay. But “colon”, being also the name 
of the main part of the large intestine passing from the caecum to 
the rectum, also hints at the limits of the organic whole of the es-
say. It hints at the ways in which, at the limits of writing, the sense 
is “exscribed”, as Nancy might put it.66 The moment of pertinence 
marked by the colon makes a point that cannot be a full stop.
66 Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy: “Exscription”, trans. Katherine Lydon, Yale French Studies, 
No. 78, 1990, 63–65.
